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Abstract(
A"significant"volume"of"research"has"discussed"value"creation"(total"value"created"in"a"given"relational"
transaction" between" two" or" more" firms)" and" value" appropriation" (level" of" value" the" focal" firm"
captures)" as" two"major" components" in" what"managers" consider" when" considering" the" outsourcing"
choice."However,"scholars"have"paid"far"less"attention"to"the"trade=offs"managers"of"a"focal"firm"make"
when" they"consider" the" total"value" that"an"outsourcing"choice"creates"and" the"value" they"expect" the"
firm"to"capture."In"a"study"of"1,728"decisions"made"by"72"managers"with"outsourcing"experience,"we"
examine" how" managers" distribute" importance" (i.e.," utility)" among" these" two" important" value"
components,"and"whether"or"not"heterogeneity"exists" in"managerial"preference"models."Our"analysis"
finds" that" value" creation" has" a" positive" influence" on" the" decision" to" outsource."Moreover," the" value"
appropriation" strengthens" this" relationship" when" the" potential" value" creation" involves" a" shared"
investment" in" resources" and" capabilities." We" also" find" significant" idiosyncrasy" in" managerial"
preference"models."In"several"cases,"the"characteristics"of"the"decision"maker"explain"a"large"portion"of"
the"variance"in"the"decision"to"outsource.(
!
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1.! INTRODUCTION(
Firms" pursuing" strategic" outsourcing" rely" on" intermediate" markets" to" provide" specialized"
capabilities"which"have"the"potential" to"create"value"beyond"cost"economies"alone"(Contractor"et"al.,"
2010;"Holcomb" and"Hitt," 2007;"Quinn" and"Hilmer," 1994)."Most" studies" view" outsourcing" choices" as"
rational"decisions"based"on"economic"factors"(e.g.,"Bettis"et"al.,"1992;"McIvor,"2009;"Walker"and"Weber,"
1984;"Williamson,"2008)"or"resource=based"factors"(e.g.,"Holcomb"and"Hitt,"2007;"McIvor,"2009;"Quinn,"
1999,"2000),"and"hence"argue"that"these"decision=making"processes"are"influenced"by"the"potential"for"
value" creation" (e.g.," cost" savings" and" access" to" resources" and" capabilities)" in" an" outsourcing"
relationship,"and"the"focal"firm’s"ability"to"capture"this"value"(Mayer"and"Salomon,"2006;"Verwaal"et"al.,"
2009)." These" studies" have" established" that" both" potential" value" creation" and" value" appropriation"
influence"strategic"outsourcing"choices,"without"going"into"detail"as"to"the"questions"of"how"much"each"
of"these"value"components"matters"in"managerial"decisions"and"whether"there"exists"heterogeneity"in"
these"decision"models."
In"this"study,"we"examine"extent"to"which"different"relational"factors"affect"managerial"choice"
when" considering" discrete" outsourcing" engagement" options" (i.e.," contracts)."We" view" the" choice" of"
strategic"outsourcing"engagement"as"a"function"of"the"value"(i.e.,"utility)"managers"associate"with"value"
creation"(total"value"created"in"a"given"outsourcing"relationship)"and"value"appropriation"(ability"of"a"
focal"firm"to"capture"value"created"in"a"given"outsourcing"relationship)."Specifically,"we"examine"how"
managers" weigh" specific" value" creation" and" value" appropriation" factors" when" choosing" among"
discrete"outsourcing"options."We"also"conduct"a"post=hoc"analysis"of"whether"heterogeneity"exists"in"
the"preference"models"of"strategic"outsourcing"decision"making,"and"what"explains"that"heterogeneity,"
should" it" exist." The"post=hoc" analysis" looks" specifically" at" idiosyncrasy" in" the"preferences"managers"
hold" about" their" choice" of" organizational" governance" forms," thereby"moving" away" from" firm=based"
logics" to" micro=foundational" behavioral" logics" to" understand" forces" that" drive" managerial" choice."
While" the" decision" to" engage" in" an" outsourcing" relationship" is" made" collectively" within" an"
organization,"individual"managers’"judgments"and"perceptions"constitute"the"micro=motor"that"guides"
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their" judgments" about" the" benefits" of" outsourcing" (Mantel" et" al.," 2006)" and" coalesce" to" constitute" a"
collective=level"decision"about"which"outsourcing"engagement"the"firm"will"pursue."Because"decision"
makers"often"base"valuation"judgments"and"choices"on"idiosyncratic"knowledge"and"preferences,"these"
judgmental"decision"outcomes"can"vary"across"managers"(Felin"and"Foss,"2005;"Felin"et"al.,"2012;"Foss"
and"Lindenberg,"2013)."
We"use"a"utility=based"experimental"method"—"discrete"choice"experimentation"(Louviere"et"
al.," 2000;"Train,"2003)"—" to"untangle" the"degree" to"which" the"different"value" components" influence"
managerial" choices"of"outsourcing."The"experimental"methodology"permits"us" to" take"a" fine=grained"
approach"by" focusing"on" the"decision"models" of" the" individual"managers"while" forcing"managers" to"
make" trade=off" in" their" choices" which" reflects" more" realistic" business" decision=making" situations"
compared" to" the" traditional" Likert" survey" based" approaches." The" orthogonal" design" used" in" our"
experiment" allows" us" to" look" at" the" effect" of" each" value" components" separately," thereby" avoiding"
confounding"effects"related"to"correlations"that"naturally"exist"amongst"the"components"of"a"decision."
The"use"of" a"Bayesian"approach" to" covariance" estimation"enables"us" to" examine"whether" individual"
managers"consistently"put"high"value"on"these"well=known"outsourcing"drivers,"and,"if"heterogeneity"
exists,"what"contributes"to"explain"this"variance."
Our"empirical"approach"leads"to"four"primary"contributions."First,"this"study"contributes"to"our"
understanding"of"the"role"of"value"creation"and"value"appropriation"in"strategic"outsourcing"decision"
making" (see" Leiblein," 2003;" Verwaal" et" al.," 2009)" by" examining" how" value" appropriation" interacts"
differently"with"different"value"creation"components"in"outsourcing"choices."Second,"while"a"plenty"of"
research" has" look" into" outsourcing" choices," less" has" empirically" examined" individual" variance" in"
outsourcing" choices." Our" post=hoc" analysis" specifically" examines" the" idiosyncrasy" in" individual"
decision" models" through" Bayesian" analysis," which" allows" us" to" extract" unexplained" variance" that"
cannot" be" captured" by" an" error" term." In" response" to" calls" for" studies" on"micro=foundational" issues"
(Devinney," 2013;" Foss" and" Lindenberg," 2013),"we" also" explain" how" the" variance" in" individual=" and"
firm=level"characteristics"can"result" in"variance! in!preference!models" for"managers"making"simulated"
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discrete" outsourcing" choices," providing" a" deeper" understanding" of" when" and" why" the" choice" of"
outsourcing" relationship" are" likely" to" be" heterogeneous." Third," by" utilizing" structured" experimental"
methods" and" Bayesian" estimation," we" move" beyond" a" focal" emphasis" on" the" development" of"
generalized" singular" model" of" choice" to" one" aimed" at" capturing" and" explaining" individual" level"
variance" in" the" decision" model" used" by" managers." Finally," a" combination" of" experimental" discrete"
choice"modeling"and"Bayesian"econometrics"potentially"opens"up"a"new"avenue"for"the"examination"of"
the"micro"foundations"of"strategy."To"date,"most"work"in"applying"micro=foundational"thinking"applies"
behavioral"logics"but"has"yet"to"coalesce"around"an"appropriate"and"accepted"set"of"methodologies"that"
link"theory"to"proof"in"a"structured"and"direct"manner"(see,"e.g.,"Devinney,"2013)."
2.! DECOMPOSING(STRATEGIC(OUTSOURCING(DECISIONS(
We"conceive"strategic"outsourcing"choices"as"being"a"combination"of"what"potential"value"—"
including" both" value" brought" in" by" the" outsourcing" provider" and" value" created" through"
complementary"resources"and"capabilities"—"can"be"created"in"a"relationship,"and"whether"a"focal"firm"
can"capture"value"in"an"efficient"way"from"an"outsourcing"engagement."Managers"are"maximizing"the"
combination"of"the"size"of"the"pie"(i.e.,"value"creation)"and"the"fraction"of"the"pie"they"can"get"(i.e.,"value"
appropriation)." The" mainstream" outsourcing" literature" suggests" two" types" of" outsourcing:" tactical"
outsourcing," which" focuses" intensively" on" cost" savings," and" strategic" outsourcing," which" concerns"
value"beyond"cost"economies."Assumptions"about"the"value"firms"expect"an"outsourcing"engagement"
to"generate"drive"this"classification.""
The"first"type"of"value"created"in"an"outsourcing"engagement"is"the"economic"value"from"cost"
savings," which" is" a" focus" of" tactical" outsourcing." Cost" advantages" from" outsourcing" arise" from"
outsourcing"provider’s"superior"efficiency"in"performing"such"activity"at"lower"costs"and"in"a"shorter"
time" (Barney," 2001;" Peteraf," 1993)." According" to" this" view," outsourcing" reflects" a" firm’s" efforts" to"
operate"more"economically"by"leveraging"on"provider’s"resources"and"capabilities."
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The"second"type"of"value"is"intangible,"non=financial"value"(e.g.,"knowledge,"innovation),"which"
is" often" a" main" focus" of" strategic" outsourcing." This" research" stream" considers" outsourcing" as" a"
strategic" tool" to" leverage" non=financial" value" potential" from" valuable" specialized" resources" and"
capabilities" beyond" a" firm’s" boundary" (Holcomb" and" Hitt," 2007;" Quinn," 2000;" Quinn" and" Hilmer,"
1994)."We"argue"that"strategic"value"from"outsourcing"may"emerge"from"two"possible"sources:"(1)"an"
outsourcing"provider’s"resources"and"capabilities,"or"(2)"shared"resources"and"capabilities"of"both"an"
outsourcing" firm" and" a" provider." Specifically," an" outsourcing" engagement" gives" a" firm" an" access" to"
valuable"external"resources"and"capabilities"(of"an"outsourcing"provider)"that"are"not"available"within"
a"firm."Firms"may"also"benefit"from"a"synergistic"value"(Dyer"and"Singh,"1998),"which"is"created"from"
complementary"resources"and"capabilities"in"an"outsourcing"engagement.""
Research" has" also" examined" the" role" of" value" appropriation" in" outsourcing" decisions."
According" to" TCE," the" risks" of" opportunism" and" bounded" rationality" are" a" major" component" of"
transaction" costs" and" pose" a" serious" threat" to" parties" in" cross=boundary" transactions" (Williamson,"
1985,"1991)."While"value"appropriation"is"rather"straightforward"in"a"full"ownership"arrangement,"the"
absence"of"ownership"or"direct"control"in"an"outsourcing"transaction"raises"the"question"of"how"value"
appropriation" can" be" enforced" (Verwaal" et" al.," 2009)," especially" in" the" case" of" innovation" (Arrow,"
1962;"Schumpeter,"1934;"Teece,"1986),"where"future"value"is"uncertain"and"difficult"to"predict"ex=ante."
We" discuss" below" a" model" of" strategic" outsourcing" decisions" based" on" a" value" creation" and" value"
appropriation"perspective"(see"Figure"1"for"the"summary"of"the"conceptual"model).1""
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
1
 While"we"recognize"there"are"a"large"number"of"variables"that"can"influence"this"decision,"we"choose"to"focus"on"
specific"variables"that"represent"different"types"of"value"creation"(economic"value"vs."strategic"value"beyond"cost"
economies)"and"value"appropriation"components."The"objective"of"this"study"is"to"examine"how"managers"make"
trade"off"among"these"value"components"and"whether"there"is"heterogeneity"in"their"preference"models."Other"
factors"not"specified"in"the"model"are"treated"as"controls"through"the"experiments’"scenario."We"validated"these"
value"components"through"interviews"with"managers"with"high"involvement"in"outsourcing"decisions. 
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2.1.!Value(Creation(Potential(in(Outsourcing(
2.1.1.!Economic(Value(from(Cost(Savings(
Outsourcing"decisions"from"the"RBV"perspective"are"often"driven"by"two"key"criteria:"the"level"
of" specificity"or" scarcity" required" to"obtain" resource"and"capability" in" the"external"market" (Argyres,"
1996)"and"the"cost"of"developing"such"resource"and"capability"or"of"acquiring"them"from"other"firms"
that"possess"them"(Barney,"1991)."More"specifically,"when"the"costs"of"using"hierarchy"are"high"a"firm"
will" adopt" a" non=hierarchical" structure" to" obtain" such" resources" and" capabilities." In" this" respect,"
resources" and" capabilities" critically" underlie" outsourcing" choices" because" obtaining" ownership"may"
require" significant" costs." RBV," hence," concludes" that" firms" should" obtain" resources" and" capabilities"
that" can" be" traded" through" the" market" to" avoid" an" investment" that" is" unlikely" to" result" in" any"
competitive" advantage" (Gilley" and" Rasheed," 2000)." Accordingly," cost=based" economics," as" a"
consequence" of" effective" governance" structures" and" the" competitive" advantage" from" firms’" unique"
resources" and" capabilities," represent" important" criteria" in" outsourcing" engagement" selection."
Consistent" with" prior" studies," we" expect" the" value" these" cost" savings" create" to" affect" the" choice" of"
outsourcing"options."
2.1.2.!Strategic(Value(beyond(Cost(Economies(
The"ability"to"access"new"and"valuable"capabilities"is"a"critical"driver"of"strategic"outsourcing"
because"these"actions"can"fundamentally"alter"a"firm’s"capability"endowments"(Morrow"et"al.,"2007)."
Strategic" value" in" an" outsourcing" relationship" includes:" (1)" the" benefits" attributed" to" resources" and"
capabilities" of" outsourcing" provider2," and" (2)" the" benefits" attributed" to" resources" and" capabilities"
shared"by"the"firm"and"its"outsourcing"provider,"referred"to"as"relational"rents"(Dyer"and"Singh,"1998).""
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
2
 The value from outsourcing providerÕs resources and capabilities might be similar to those discussed in the provider 
selection studies (see, for example, Sarkis and Talluri, 2002; Schiele, 2006; Verma and Pullman, 1998). However, in 
this study, we look at a broader decision of outsourcing engagement selection, which involves both value an 
outsourcing provider can offer and value that requires the contribution of both parties as well as ability of an 
outsourcing firm to capture these values. 
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2.1.2.1.!Value(from(the(Provider’s(Resources(and(Capabilities(
The" first" strategic" value" from" the" provider’s" resources" and" capabilities" emerges" from" the"
provider’s! motivation! to! innovate." Firms" considering" outsourcing" benefit" from" such" governance"
structure" when" it" allows" them" to" enrich" and" extend" their" knowledge" stock," tap" into" specialized"
capabilities" and" fill" voids" in" their" endowment" (Mowery" et" al.," 1996;" Steensma" and" Corley," 2000;"
Weigelt,"2009)."The"intrinsic"motivation"in"the"outsourcing"provider"arises"from"the"centrality"of"the"
specific"outsourced"task(s)"to"the"provider"and"task=focused"motivation"(Sternberg"and"Lubart,"1991,"
1993),"and"encourages"the"provider"to"invest"its"effort"and"resources"in"the"target"work"domain."This"
also"generates"an"incentive"to" innovate"(Alexander"and"Young,"1996),"because"the" link"between"task"
improvement" and" rewards" becomes" increasingly" apparent." A" competitive" marketplace" also" adds"
powerful"incentives"for"outsourcing"providers"to"innovate"continuously"in"order"to"gain"market"share"
(Baldwin"and"Clark,"2000;"Brown"et" al.," 2002;"Domberger,"1998)."The"natural" forces"of" competition"
encourage"providers"to"find"new"niches"where"they"can"differentiate"themselves"from"their"rivals."This"
value" from" the" outsourcing" provider’s" motivation" offers" a" strong" incentive" for" firms" to" consider"
outsourcing"as"a"way"to"create"or"sustain"performance"advantages"in"the"market."Hence,"we"expect"to"
observe" a" positive" relationship" between" a" provider’s" motivation" to" innovate" and" outsourcing"
engagement"decision."
The" second" value" component" arising" from" the" resources" and" capabilities" of" outsourcing"
providers" is" task! specialization." By" serving"many" clients"with" similar"needs," outsourcing"providers"
are"more"likely"to"make"specific"investments"to"build"up"capabilities"in"their"specialized"domain."Task"
specialization" arises" because" of" access" to" sufficient" human" and" organizational" resources" (e.g.," the"
increased"size"of"knowledge"base"(Ahuja"and"Katila,"2001))"and"the"buildup"of"specialized"capabilities"
(e.g.," a" firm’s" absorptive" capacity" (Cohen" and" Levinthal," 1990))." It" allows" outsourcing" providers" to"
achieve" an" efficient" degree" of" specialization,"which" yields" increased" innovative" output." Because" this"
specialized" knowledge" is" difficult" to" articulate" and" costly" to" transfer" (Polanyi," 1958;" Teece," 1998),"
firms" may" acquire" access" to" these" valuable"—" yet" specialized"—" capabilities" via" their" outsourcing"
7"
engagements" (Azadegan" and" Dooley," 2010;" Holcomb" and" Hitt," 2007)." The" heterogeneity" of" the"
knowledge"bases"within"a"firm"along"its"value"chain"(Ghemawat"and"Costa,"1993)"thus"determines"the"
gains" from" task" specialization." So," in" a" real" sense," “managerial" diseconomies" of" scope”" result" from"
differences" in" the" requisite" capabilities" and" styles" of" each" segment" (Richardson," 1972)." These"
managerial"diseconomies"drive"the"latent"gains"from"specialization,"which,"in"turn,"create"the"need"for"
an"intermediate"market"to"emerge,"as"well"as"for"it"to"determine"the"extent"to"which"trade"affects"the"
creation" and"appropriation"of" value" in" a" given"market" (Jacobides" and"Hitt," 2005)." Consequently,"we"
expect"task"specialization"of"an"outsourcing"provider"to"pose"a"positive"effect"on"strategic"outsourcing"
choices."
The" third" value" component" is"knowledge! diversity." The" efficient" exploitation" of" the" diverse"
knowledge" base" of" outsourcing" providers" results" from" knowledge" reapplication" and" recombination"
(Alavi"and"Leidner,"2001;"Majchrzak"et"al.,"2004)."The"diversity"of"knowledge"and"skills"is"a"powerful"
predictor"of"innovation"and"value"creation"because"it"brings"useful"and"differing"perspectives"together"
(Chesbrough," 2003;" Cohen" and" Levinthal," 1990;" Hargadon" and" Sutton," 1997;" Paulus," 2000;" Sutton,"
2001;"West,"2002)."However,"organizations"often"do"not"possess"adequate"diversity"of"knowledge"and"
skills"to"innovate"in"all"the"necessary"functions,"while"outsourcing"providers,"who"serve"many"clients"
facing"various"challenges" in"different" industries,"are"more" likely" to"recombine"a" range"of"knowledge"
and" experience" and" apply" them" to" generate" innovative" products" and" processes" for" other" clients" or"
industries."An"outsourcing"engagement"will"become"a"preferred"option"when"it"offers"the"potential"to"
extend"a"firm’s"innovation"scope"beyond"internal"resources"and"outstrip"the"knowledge"endowment"of"
an" individual" firm" (Mol" and" Kotabe," 2011)." Accordingly," we" argue" that" value" from" outsourcing"
provider’s"knowledge"diversity"has"a"positive"effect"on"the"choice"of"outsourcing"options."
2.1.2.2.!Value(from(Shared(Resources(and(Capabilities(
Inter7firm!complementarity"is"the"value"arising"from"those"resources"and"capabilities"shared"
by" both" the" firm" and" its" outsourcing" provider." Many" strategy" scholars" have" argued" that" firms"may"
enhance" their" value" chain" performance"when" they" align"with" exchange" partners" in" order" to" access"
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complementary" capabilities" (Araujo" et" al.," 2003;" Arora" and" Gambardella," 1990;" Cassiman" and"
Veugelers,"2006;"Mudambi"and"Tallman,"2010;"Rothaermel,"2001;"Teece,"1986)."The" relational"view"
(Dyer" and" Singh," 1998)" suggests" that" firms" can" develop" valuable" resources" by" carefully" managing"
relationships"with"external"entities,"and"that"the"complementarity"of" internal"and"external"resources"
and" capability" allows" firms" to" generate" greater" rents" than" the" sum" of" those" obtained" from" the"
individual" resources" of" each" partner."When" an" outsourcing" engagement" can" provide" access" to" such"
complementary" capabilities," it" becomes" an" important" source" of" innovation" (Clegg" et" al.," 2005)," and,"
hence,"a"strong"incentive"to"choose"a"strategic"outsourcing"engagement"(Araujo"et"al.,"2003)."Thus,"we"
argue"that"inter=firm"complementarity"has"a"positive"effect"on"the"choice"of"outsourcing"options."
2.2.!Value(Appropriation(Capability(of(Outsourcing(Contracts(
As"firms" increasingly"use"external"relationships"to"acquire"new"knowledge"and"support" their"
innovation"and"value"creation"activities,"it"is"important"that"they"develop"a"capability"to"govern"these"
relationships." Value" appropriation" risks" are" particularly" critical" for" outsourcing," compared" to" other"
forms"of"inter=firm"relationship"(e.g.,"alliance),"simply"because"of"the"relinquishment"of"the"control"of"
assets" and" the" opportunism" in" arm’s" length" relationships." Exchange" hazards" (i.e.," asset=specific" and"
environmental" uncertainty)" are" detrimental" to" market" efficiency" because" they" lead" to" increasingly"
complex" contractual" relationships" and," hence," increase" ex=post" transaction" costs" (Barthelemy" and"
Quelin,"2006;"Grimpe"and"Kaiser,"2010;"Williamson,"1991)."Verwaal"et"al."(2009)"show"that"risks"for"
value" appropriation" (i.e.," asset" specificity" and" switching" costs)" pose" a" negative" influence" on"
outsourcing"decisions."To"avoid,"or"at"least"mitigate,"these"risks,"firms"need"mechanisms"to"protect"the"
potential" values" and" manage" risks" that" might" arise" in" an" engagement." One" such" widely" discussed"
mechanism" is" the" degree" to" which" corporations" can" draw" up" reasonably" efficient" outsourcing"
contracts"(Barthelemy,"2003;"Cao"and"Lumineau,"2015;"Gopal"et"al.,"2003;"Handley"and"Benton,"2009;"
Harris"et"al.,"1998;"Lumineau"and"Quélin,"2012;"Mayer"and"Argyres,"2004;"Saunders"et"al.,"1997)"that"
aid" in"governing"the"relationship"with" its"outsourcing"provider,"and"ensure"that"value"created" in"the"
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relationship" can" be" effectively" captured." We," hence," argue" that" an" outsourcing" firm’s" capability" to"
appropriate"value" from"an"outsourcing"relationship"has"a"positive"effect"on" its"choice"of"outsourcing"
options."
2.3.!Interaction(between(Value(Creation(and(Value(Appropriation(
In"addition"to"the"direct"effect"of"value"appropriation"capability,"we"argue"that"the"moderating"
role"of"value"appropriation"is"prevalent"when"value"creation"potential"involves"strategic"value,"which"
is"more"difficult"to"monitor"and"capture"as"compared"to"economic"value"from"cost"savings,"where"firms"
can"extract"value"via"a"more"complete"market."Despite"the"fact"that"outsourcing"engagements"hold"the"
potential"to"create"value,"there"are"no"guarantees"that"a"firm"will"capture"all"or"even"a"portion"of"the"
gains" from"an"outsourcing"engagement."Hence,"we"argue" that"a" focal" firm’s"capability" to"capture" the"
value" outsourcing" engagements" create" positively"moderate" the" relationship" between" value" creation"
drivers"and"managerial"choice"of"an"outsourcing"engagement"option."
As" we" distinguish" between" value" generated" from" an" outsourcing" provider’s" resources" and"
capabilities" and" value" generated" from" shared" resources" and" capabilities," value" from" provider’s"
resources"and"capabilities" (i.e.,"motivation," task" specialization"and"knowledge"diversity)" requires"no"
firm" investment" on" resources" and" capabilities." On" the" other" hand," value" from" inter=firm"
complementarity"requires"both"parties"in"a"relationship"to"bring"resources"and"capabilities"to"the"table"
(Dyer"and"Singh,"1998;"Dyer"et"al.,"2008)."It"is"the"uncertainty"in"the"size"of"the"pie"created"that"poses"
the"risk,"which"becomes"even"greater"as"the"investment"in"shared"resources"and"capabilities"increases."
Hence,"the"adverse"effect"of"opportunism"and"the"lack"of"value"appropriation"capability"is"expected"to"
be"greater"when"the"value"is"created"by"a"synergy"of"internal"and"external"resources"(Dyer"and"Singh,"
1998),"or"when"external"resources"enhance"internal"resources"(Argyres,"1996;"Kogut,"2000).""
When" outsourcing" involves" a" complicated" relationship" involving" a" shared" investment" in"
resources" and" capabilities," the" allocation" of" rents" becomes" ambiguous," pressuring" the" firm" to" focus"
more"heavily"on"their"capability"to"capture"the"return"on"their" investment"efficiently"(Lumineau"and"
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Quélin," 2012)." Under" such" conditions," firms" are"more" sensitive" to" the" efficient" value" appropriating"
mechanism"when" value" from" inter=firm" complementarity" is" expected." More" specifically," we" predict"
that" the" moderating" effect" of" value" appropriation" on" the" value" arising" from" inter=firm"
complementarity"will"be" stronger"as" compared" to" its"moderating"effects"on" the"other" types"of"value"
creation,"which"involve"only"resources"and"capabilities"of"an"outsourcing"provider."
3.! METHODS(
3.1.!Research(Participants(
We" identified"a" sample"of"managers"and"executives" involved" in"outsourcing"decision"making"
using" the" 2009"membership" database" of" the" International" Association" of" Outsourcing" Professionals"
(IAOP),"a"global"consortium"of"leading"companies"involved"in"outsourcing"as"customers,"providers,"or"
advisors."Managers" that" are"members" of" IAOP" play" an" active" role" in" outsourcing" for" the" firms" they"
represent." From" this" database," we" randomly" selected" a" subsample" of" the" executives" and" senior"
managers"with"experience"in"outsourcing"decision"making"to"contact"for"interviews."Sixteen"executives"
and" senior" managers" agreed" to" participate" in" our" semi=structured" interviews," which" sought"
participants’" opinions" about" factors" underlying" their" outsourcing" engagement" selections," outcome"
expectations" and" experience" with" successful" and" unsuccessful" outsourcing" engagements." These"
interviews"allowed"us"to"ensure"the"external"validity"for"our"experimental"instruments"and"pretest"the"
model"of"strategic"outsourcing"decision"making"discussed"earlier."We"also"used"the"findings"from"these"
interviews"to"derive"attributes,"levels,"and"experimental"scenarios"used"in"the"experiments."
After"the"initial"interviews,"we"contacted"1,500"members"of"the"IAOP"via"email"and"requested"
their"participation"in"the"experiment."One"hundred"and"ninety=eight"IAOP"members"(response"rate"of"
13.2%)"agreed"to"participate"in"the"first"experiment"(known"as"a"best=worst"experiment"and"explained"
shortly)."Approximately"three"months"later,"we"conducted"a"second"survey"of"the"original"pool"of"198"
managers;" seventy=two" managers" agreed" to" participate" in" the" follow=up" experiment" (known" as" a"
discrete" choice" experiment" and" explained" shortly)." These"managers"were" familiar"with"outsourcing,"
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held"senior"positions"in"their"organizations"(with"the"median"levels"between"a"respondent"and"CEO"of"
3),"and"had"led"or"participated"on"a"team"responsible"for"at"least"one"outsourcing"engagement,"with"57"
percent" having" more" than" 6" years" of" experience" in" outsourcing" decision" making." These" managers"
represented" a" balanced" cross=section"of" large"multinational" firms" and" small=" to"medium=sized" firms"
from" a" variety" of" different" geographic" locations" and" industries," with" a" median" firm" size" of"
approximately"5,000"employees.3""
3.2.!Research(Variables(
Dependent!variable."The"dependent"variable"is"the"manager’s"choice"of"a"preferred"outsourcing"
option" (value" of" 1" when" the" respondent" selected" a" preferred" outsourcing" option" and" value" of" 0"
otherwise)" among" potential" outsourcing" options" (i.e.," two" options" in" DCE," see" Figure" 2)." Figure" 2"
shows"an"example"of"DCE"choice"tasks"and"will"be"explained"in"the"next"section."We"asked"managers"to"
make" outsourcing" choices" while" we"manipulated" the" level" of" variables" to" observe" how" each" factor"
poses"different"effects"on"managerial"choices"and"how"managers"traded"off"among"these"variables."
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Decision! attributes." The" explanatory" variables" (i.e.," decision" attributes)" include" the" six" value"
components"discussed" earlier" (see" Figure"1)." To" facilitate" respondents" completing" the" experimental"
task,"we"rename"some"theoretical"outsourcing"factors"discussed"earlier"so"that"they"were"expressed"in"
terms" managers" use" regularly" and" understand. " Despite" the" variation" in" the" name," the" meanings"
remain"the"same"as"what"we"discussed"earlier"in"the"theoretical"section."To"ensure"a"common,"accurate"
understanding"of"the"meaning"of"factors"we"prompt"every"respondent"with"the"definition"of"decision"
attributes"(as"shown"in"Table"1)"prior"to"outsourcing"decision"tasks"and"throughout"the"experiment."
During"our" interviews,"we" identified" two" additional" environmental" factors" that"managers" suggested"
had"an"impact"on"their"choice"of"outsourcing"option—the"directionality"of"a"to=be=outsourced"activity"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
3
 Due to page limitation, the detail on sample characteristics is omitted in this article but available from the authors 
upon request. 
12"
(i.e.," customer=facing" or" backroom" operation)" and" the" risks" associated" with" an" outsourcing"
engagement." As" a" result," we" included" these" two" factors" as" control" variables" in" the" outsourcing"
scenarios" that" we" associated" with" the" experimental" task." In" other" words," they" are" higher=level"
experimental"manipulations"that"we"varied"across"individuals."The"detail"on"discrete"choice"task"and"
outsourcing" engagement" decision" scenarios" (i.e.," how" managers" were" instructed" to" complete" the"
choice" tasks)" are" further" described" in" Appendix" A." Table" II" lists" the" six" attributes" included" in" the"
experimental"task"and"their"levels."
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table I and II about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
3.3.!Research(Task(and(Experimental(Design(
Untangling" the" weight" distribution" of" value" components" and" capturing" heterogeneity" in"
managerial"preference"models"of"outsourcing"decision"making"are"challenging"because"variation"in"the"
decision"weights"must"be"examined"while"ensuring"that"the"decision"context"and"variables"underlying"
outsourcing" decisions" remains" constant." In" this" study," we" use" stated=preference" (SP)" experimental"
methods,"which"provide"flexibility"in"the"construction"of"realistic"business"decision=making"scenarios"
and" the" ability" to" disentangle" decision" factors" that" may" be" difficult" to" capture" in" surveys" or"
conventional"panel"datasets." In" the"current" case," the"SP"method" is"uniquely"appropriate"because"we"
are" investigating"potential" benefits" and" expected" value" appropriation" capability" as"well" as" potential"
relationships" that"may"not"naturally"occur" in" the"market,"and"hence,"be" the"bases"of"an"econometric"
examination" using" panel" data" (which" clearly" do" not" exist)." Controversially," most" strategy" and"
management"research"has"been"limited"to"the"traditional"methods"that"do"not"allow"us"to"disentangle"
complex"decisions.4"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
4
 The SP method has been found useful in the studies of judgment and decision making Ñ especially in the marketing, 
transportation, and health economics fields, where the conventional revealed-preference (RP) data do not exist for new 
products or new public transportation modes and routes (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Chen and Hausman, 2000; 
Hensher, 1994). The SP approach could also be useful in many other fields where analysis of behavior and decision 
making is limited to the quality of RP data (Whitehead et al., 2008). It is relatively new to strategy and management, 
but has increasingly gained recognition and popularity (Anderson et al., 2011; Brazell et al., 2005; Buckley et al., 2007; 
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In" this" study," we" applied" two" SP" experimental" methods" to" examine" managerial" choice" of"
different"strategic"outsourcing"models."We"first"used"best=worst"scaling"(BW)"experiment"(Flynn"et"al.,"
2007;"Louviere,"1991;"Marley"and"Louviere,"2005)"to"extract"comparable"scales"and"ranking"orders"of"
value" components." The" findings" from" the" BW" experiment" give" us" a" broad" idea" of" the" relative"
significance" of" value" components,"which" allows" us" to" focus" on" the"most" relevant" value" components"
and," hence," keep" the"main" experiment" at" a"manageable" size."We" summarized" the" results" of" our"BW"
experiment"in"Appendix"A."The"main"experimental"method"applied"is"the"discrete"choice"experiment"
(DCE)" (Louviere" et" al.," 2000;" Train," 2003)." DCE," with" a" theoretical" basis" in" random" utility" theory"
(McFadden,"1973;"Thurstone,"1927),"allows"us"to"examine"both"direct"and"interaction"effects"of"each"
value"component"on"outsourcing"selection.""
We" based" the" design" of" the" DCE" on" the" orthogonal" fractional" factorial" design" (Street" and"
Burgess"2004,"2007;"Street"et"al."2005),"which"allowed"us"to"use"an"orthogonal"design"(i.e.,"testing"no"
correlation"between"variables)"to"estimate"the"main"effects"of"each"value"components"and"moderating"
effects"between"value"appropriation"capability"and"value"creation"components."In"the"DCE,"we"placed"
each"respondent"in"one"of"two"outsourcing"situations:!the"outsourcing"of"a"customer=facing"operation"
or" the" outsourcing" of" a" backroom" operation." We" controlled" the" level" of" risk" associated" with" the"
outsourcing"engagement"and"held"the"level"of"risk"constant"in"both"outsourcing"scenarios"by"indicating"
“the"outsourcing"decision"being"made"represents"a"relatively"large"investment"…”"in"each"scenario"(see"
Appendix"B"for"further"detail"on"decision"situations)."As"shown"in"Figure"2,"we"instructed"respondents"
to"make" decisions" about" 24" outsourcing" engagement" pairs" with" varying" levels" across" the" six" value"
components" by" indicating" which" of" the" options:" (1)" “would" be" their" most" preferred”" and" (2)" they"
would"“recommend"to"their" firm’s"board"of"directors”"with"a"“none”"option."These"two"decisions"are"
akin" to" asking" the"manager" a" “consideration" set”" question" and" “forced=to=choose”" question." In" this"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" ""
Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Patzelt and Shepherd, 2008; Priem et al., 2011; Robert Mitchell et 
al., 2011; Venkatesh et al., 2012). 
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sense," the" choice" from" question" (2)" generates" individuals’" consideration" set" individuals" that" would"
include"the"forced=to=choose"choice"from"decision"(1).""
4.! RESULTS(
4.1.!Discrete(Choice(Model(Aggregate(Sample(Results(
To"estimate"the"probability"of"a"manager"choosing"each"outsourcing"engagement,"we"employed"
the"multinomial"logit"(MNL)"model"(Train,"2003)"(see"Appendix"C"for"more"detail)."Table"III"presents"
the" results" from" series" of"MNL" analyses" on" responses" from" the"DCE." The" dependent" variable" is" the"
choice"of"the"outsourcing"engagement"possessing"the"focal"factor"levels,"as"represented"by"Question"1"
(see" Figure" 2);" in" other" words," a" selected" option," which" is" a" manager’s" most" preferred" strategic"
outsourcing"engagement,"will"be"valued"1,"otherwise,"valued"0."Each"respondent"made"24"(choice"sets)"
×"2"(options)"="48"choices,"nested"within"choice"sets"of"two."Model"1"in"Table"III"reveals"that"each"of"
the" six" value" components" has" a" direct" and" meaningful" impact" on" outsourcing" option" selection." As"
expected," an" outsourcing" provider’s"motivation" to" innovate" (β" =" 0.338," p" <" 0.001)" has" a" significant"
positive" influence" on" outsourcing" engagement" selection." The" results" also" show" that" both" inter=firm"
complementarity"(β"="0.313,"p"<"0.001)"and"value"appropriation"capability"(β"="0.314,"p"<"0.001)"have"
a" statistically" significant" effect" on" firms’" choices" of" outsourcing" engagement." In" line"with" the" result"
from" the"BW" experiment" and" prior" studies," economic" value" from" cost" savings" is" another" important"
factor"underlying"outsourcing"engagement"selection"(β"="0.291,"p"<"0.001)."Interestingly,"although"cost"
saving"is"traditionally"considered"the"focal"incentive"for"an"outsourcing"engagement,"we"found"that"its"
relative" effect" was" smaller" than" value" from" motivation," inter=firm" complementarity," and" value"
appropriation" (0.291" compared" to" 0.338;" 0.313" and" 0.314)5." Outsourcing" providers’" knowledge"
diversity" and" task" specialization" were" the" two" factors" with" the" smallest" effect" size" on" outsourcing"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
5 The effect of cost savings is significantly smaller than that of value for motivation. However, the difference between 
the effect of cost savings and that of inter-firm complementarity and value appropriation is not statistically significant. 
Please refer to Appendix D for the full results of the test for significance of differences among coefficients. 
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choices."While"knowledge"diversity"(β"="0.029,"p"<"0.01)"had"a"significant,"though"small,"positive"effect,"
task"specialization6"(β"="−0.097,"p"<"0.001)"had"a"negative"effect"on"an"outsourcing"decision."
 ------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table III about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
To"examine"the"interplay"between"value"creation"and"value"appropriation"components,"Model"
2" includes" interaction" terms" between" value" appropriation" and" the" four" value" creation" factors." The"
result" illustrates"the"significant"positive"moderating"effect"of"value"appropriation"on"the"relationship"
between" inter=firm" complementarity" (β" =" 0.055," p" <" 0.001)" and" outsourcing" choices," implying" that"
firms"are"cognizant"of"their"potential"ability"to"appropriate"value"from"the"complementary"investment"
of" internal"and"external"resources"and"capabilities"they"have"made"in"their"outsourcing"engagement."
The"moderating"effect"of"value"appropriation"capability"on"knowledge"diversity"(β"="−0.033,"p"<"0.001)"
and" task" specialization" (β" =" −0.033," p" <" 0.01)" are" significant," although" the" estimates" are" small" and"
negative," suggesting" the" slight" attenuating" effect" of" value" appropriation" on" the" positive" effect" of"
knowledge"diversity,"and"the"negative"effect"of"task"specialization"on"outsourcing"choices."The"result,"
however,"shows"insignificant"estimates"of"the"interaction"between"value"appropriation"and"value"from"
motivation"(β"="−0.017,"p"="n.s.).""
The" interaction"between"value" appropriation" and" inter=firm" complementarity" is" significantly"
larger" in" size" than" other" interaction" terms" (see" Appendix" D)." This" finding" provides" an" interesting"
implication,"suggesting"the"more"certain"managers"are"about"their"capability"to"appropriate"the"value"
created" in" an" outsourcing" relationship," the" more" willing" they" are" to" take" into" account" the" shared"
investment"in"complementary"resources"and"capabilities"when"choosing"an"outsourcing"engagement."
4.2.!PostSHoc(Analysis:(Heterogeneity(in(Strategic(Outsourcing(Decisions(
While" the" aggregate" results" offer" insights" about" the" relative" significance" of" each" value"
component" and" their" interplay" in" an" outsourcing" selection"model," they" do" not" allow" us" to" identify"
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """""""""""""""""""""
6
 It should be noted that all variables were effect coded (with -1 or +1) in our analysis and, hence, reverse coding for 
industry specialization (as opposed to knowledge diversity) is not an issue here. 
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whether" there" are" different" preference" profiles" in" the" sample." One" of" the" fundamental" precepts" of"
modern"strategic"thinking"is"that"firms"survive"and"persist"because"of"the"underlying"heterogeneity"in"
their" assets" and" capabilities" (see," e.g.," Penrose," 1959;" Richardson," 1972)." Indeed," much" of" strategy"
research" is" focused" on" discovering" the" sources" of" this" advantage." From" our" perspective," there" is"
considerable"evidence"of"a"lack"of"consistency"in"strategic"decision"making"(Eisenhardt"and"Zbaracki,"
1992;"March"and"Heath,"1994),"which"arises"not" just" from"firms"operating"in"different"environments"
(Bourgeois," 1984)," but" also" from" the" differences" in" capabilities" that" emerge" from" differences" in"
managerial"intentionality"and"managers’"perception"of"feasible"strategic"paths"(Nelson,"1991).""
The"mainstream"strategy" literature"points"out" that"variation"at" the"micro"(i.e.,"actor=specific)"
level" serves" as" a" fundamental" source" of" the" heterogeneity" in" strategic" decision" making" at" the"
organizational" level." In" their" plea" for" providing" micro=foundations" in" the" field" of" strategic"
management," Felin" and" Foss" (2005)" argue" that" individuals" matter" and" that" micro=foundations" are"
needed" for" explanation" in" strategic"organization." In"particular,"micro=foundational" thinking" suggests"
that" the" sources" of" heterogeneity" are" rooted" in" the" characteristics" of" individuals" who" make" path=
dependent"decision"(Felin"and"Foss,"2005;"Felin"et"al.,"2012)."Strategic"decision=making"processes"are"
shown"to"be" influenced"by" the"decision"maker’s"prior"knowledge"and"experiences" (Barr"et"al.,"1992;"
Walsh," 1995)," the" organizational" context" in"which" they" are" embedded" (Kaplan," 2008;"Ocasio," 1997;"
Simon," 1947)," and" the" nature" of" the" environment" itself" (Nadkarni" and" Barr," 2008)." This" line" of"
argument"suggests" that"we"should"come"to"expect"considerable"heterogeneity" in"manager’s"decision"
models"and"outcomes."
Our" principle" focus" in" the" post=hoc" analysis" is" on" two" issues." First," we" examine" the"
heterogeneity" in" the" relative" significance" of" value" creation" and" value" appropriation" components" in"
strategic"outsourcing"choices"across"individuals"and"argue"that"there"exist"more"than"one"preference"
models" (i.e.," how" individual" managers" distribute" weight" among" value" components)" operating" in"
outsourcing" decisions." While" both" academics" and" practitioners" identify" economic" value" from" cost"
savings"as"the"most"attractive"feature"of"outsourcing"engagements,"we"observe"a"significant"number"of"
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cases" where" firms" place" more" importance" on" other" value" components" of" the" engagement" (e.g.,"
strategic" value" beyond" cost" savings," ability" to" capture" value" created" in" a" relationship)." It" is" the"
heterogeneity" in" the" set" of" factors" underlying" outsourcing" engagement" selection" and" the" weighted"
distribution"among"these"factors"that"is"our"main"interest.""
Together," individual=level" data" collected" from" experiments" and" estimates" of" individuals’"
parameters" derived" from" the" Bayesian" estimation" allows" us" to" estimate" individual" models" of"
outsourcing" choices" and" reveal" the" potential" heterogeneity" in" these" strategic" decisions" across"
managers."More"specifically,"we"utilized"a"hierarchical"Bayes"(HB)"estimation"approach"with"a"normal"
prior"for"respondents’"preferences,"!(#, %)"where"D"is"the"variance"of"#"across" individuals."Table"IV"
provides"the"results"of"HB"analysis"with"the"means"of" the"estimated"individual"parameters"and"their"
overall"heterogeneity."Taken"together,"these"results"are"consistent"with"the"results"of"our"DCE"analyses"
that" we" discussed" previously," and" demonstrate" that" considerable" variability" exists" in" managers’"
strategic"outsourcing"preferences."
============================================================"
Insert"Table"IV"about"here"
============================================================"
Second,"we"examine"whether"we"could"provide"a"preliminary"model"of"heterogeneity"based"on"
the" characteristics" of" the" decision"makers" and/or" their" organization." To" do" this"we" regressed" each"
value" component’s" coefficients" for" each" individual" on" individual=" and" firm=level" covariates" using"
weighted" least" square" (WLS)" regression" where" an" inverse" of" variance," 1/D," of" each" estimated"
coefficient"was"applied"as"a"weight" for"WLS." In"this"study,"we"focused"on"three"groups"of"covariates:"
(1)" the" decision" maker’s" characteristics" (i.e.," report" levels" to" CEO," industry" experience," and"
outsourcing" decision=making" experience)," (2)" a" firm’s" operating" industry," and" (3)" its" headquarter"
location."
============================================================"
Insert"Table"V"about"here"
============================================================"
Table" V" provides" the" WLS" regression" results." Of" the" six" value" components," individual=" and"
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firm=level" covariates" did" not" influence" managerial" preferences" for" cost" savings" and" value" from"
motivation." The" results" also" show" that" decision" makers" from" some" industries" placed" significantly"
stronger"value"on"task"specialization"and"knowledge"diversity."More"specifically,"managers/executives"
from"mining"and"natural"resource"extraction"(β"="3.824,"p!<"0.1),"transportation"(β"="2.870,"p!<"0.01),"
financial" services" (β" =" 2.223," p! <" 0.01)," and" manufacturing" (β" =" 1.943," p! <" 0.01)" valued" task"
specialization"more"highly"than"their"peers,"while"those"from"pharmaceuticals/biotech"(β"="3.844,"p!<"
0.001),"healthcare/education/social"services"(β"="1.502,"p!<"0.1),"and"financial"services"(β"="0.985,"p!<"
0.1)" allocated" a" significantly" higher" value" to" knowledge" diversity" in" their" selection" of" strategic"
outsourcing"engagements."This" result" suggests" an" interesting" implication" that"decision"makers" from"
financial"services,"by"far"one"of"the"biggest"and"most"sophisticated"user"of"outsourcing"services,"focus"
on" both" knowledge" depth" and" breadth" (i.e.," task" specialization" and" knowledge" diversity)" of" their"
outsourcing"contractors"as"well"as"synergistic"value"from"an"outsourcing"engagement"(discussed"next)."
The" results" further" suggest" that" there" is" heterogeneity" in" the" preferences" for" inter=firm"
complementarity"across"decision"makers’"seniority"and"firms’"operating"industries."In"particular,"high=
level" executives"—" i.e.," CEO" (β" =" 1.089,"p!<" 0.1)" and" executives"with" two" levels" report" to" CEO" (β" ="
1.075,"p!<"0.01)"—"placed"a"significantly"higher"value"on"potential" inter=firm"complementarity"when"
making" their" strategic" outsourcing" decisions." This" is" consistent" with" prior" studies" arguing" that"
outsourcing"is"viewed"as"a"strategic"tool"by"the"top"management"team,"while"being"mostly"perceived"as"
an"operational"quick"fix"by"front=line"managers"(e.g.,"Heijiman"et"al.,"2008)."A"firm’s"operating"industry"
also"accounts"for"variance"in"managerial"preference"for"inter=firm"complementarity;"decision"makers"
from"mining/natural"resource"extraction"(β"="3.087,"p!<"0.01),"government/NGO"(β"="2.683,"p!<"0.01),"
utilities/construction" (β"="1.515,"p!<"0.1)," and" financial" services" (β"="1.021,"p!<"0.1)" strongly"valued"
inter=firm"complementarity"in"their"strategic"outsourcing"choices."
Managerial" preferences" for" value" appropriation"vary" considerably" in" the" represented"model."
Most"of"the"heterogeneity"in"value"appropriation"(R2"="0.594)"is"amenable"to"ex=ante"characterization"
of"the"decision"makers"and"firms."With"the"exception"of"headquarter"location,"the"results"indicate"that"
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the"covariates"in"our"model"explain"a"significant"majority"of"the"variance"in"managerial"preference"for"
value"appropriation." Interestingly,"C=suite"executives"revealed"a"significantly"stronger"preference" for"
value" appropriation" in" their" strategic" outsourcing" choices" (β" =" 0.876," p! <" 0.01)." However," CEOs"
themselves" valued" the" capability" to" capture"potential" benefits" in" strategic" outsourcing"engagements"
significantly" less" than" their" subordinates"did" (β"=" ˗1.670,"p!<"0.001)." In"other"words,"CEOs" indicated"
that"they"are"willing"to"rely"less"on"a"formal"contract"(Poppo"and"Zenger,"2002)"to"appropriate"value"
from" their" outsourcing" relationships." Furthermore," value" appropriation" mattered" less" for" decision"
makers"with"extensive" industry"and"outsourcing"decision=making"experience."Why"this"might"be" the"
case"is"not"clear,"except"perhaps"that"those"managers"with"more"outsourcing"experience"know"better"
how"to"structure"arrangements" to"capture"value,"and"hence,"need" to" rely" less"on"clearly" stated" legal"
guarantees." In" terms" of" industry" effects," the" results" reveal" that" managers/executives" from"
mining/natural"resource"extraction,"transportation,"and"utilities/construction"expressed"less"concern"
over"the"issue"of"value"appropriation"in"their"strategic"outsourcing"choices."This"could"be"because"the"
nature" of" provider" relationships" in" these" industries" is" more" trust" based" and" long=term" oriented"
compared"to"others."
Variation" in" strategic" outsourcing"decisions" is" particularly" crucial," because" these" choices" are"
often"long=term"strategic"commitments"that"are"difficult"to"reverse"(Hoetker,"2005;"Novak"and"Stern,"
2008)."More"broadly," variance" in" strategic"decision"making" reflects"an"attempt" to"adapt" to" changing"
environmental" conditions" (Hogarth" and" Makridakis," 1981)," and" hence," may" be" reflective" of"
heterogeneity"in"the"firm’s"overall"strategy."In"line"with"the"microfoundations"perspective,"the"findings"
from"our"post=hoc" analysis" suggest" that" a" set" of" value" components" that"managers" take" into" account"
when"selecting"outsourcing"engagement,"and"how"managers"distribute"the"weight"among"these"value"
components" in" their" decision" calculus," depend" not" only" the" individual’s" and" firm’s" resources" and"
capabilities,"but"remain"fundamentally"idiosyncratic"to"a"specific"manager.""
============================================================"
Insert"Table"VI"about"here"
============================================================"
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To" further" compare" unique" variation" explained" by" each" group" of" covariates," we" ran" a"
hierarchical" regression," adding" individual=level" covariates" (i.e.," report" levels" to" CEO," industry"
experience," and" outsourcing" decision=making" experience)" and" then" firm=level" covariates" (i.e.,"
headquarter"location"and"operating"industry)."Table"VI"shows"the"adjusted"R"squared"for"each"model."
The"results"are"consistent"with"what"we"see"in"Table"V."Headquarter"location"offered"a"very"minor,"if"
not" no," explanation" about" the" variance" in" the" outsourcing" choices" across" all" outsourcing" value"
components." None" of" the" covariates" provides" an" important" contribution" to" the" variance" in" how"
managers"value" cost" savings" in" their"outsourcing" selections."The" results" further" suggest" that" a" large"
part"of"variance"in"value"appropriation,"task"specialization"and"inter=firm"complementary"is"captured"
by"differences"in"a"firm’s"operating"industry."Interestingly,"decision=maker"level"covariates"collectively"
explain"61.6%"of"the"variance"in"value"from"motivation"and"adjusted"R"squared"dropped"after"adding"
in"headquarter"location"(adj!R2"="0.411)"and"operating"industry"(adj!R2"="0.196)"variables."This"further"
supports" our" argument" that" the" managers’" choices" of" strategic" outsourcing" engagement" are" not"
homogeneous" and" that" not" only" organizational" factors" but" also" decision" maker’s" characteristics"
influence" managerial" choice." More" broadly," our" finding" suggests" that" while" firm=level" covariates"
explain"a"large"part"of"variance"in"strategic"outsourcing"decision=making,"we"should"not"ignore"the"role"
of"characteristics"of"decision=makers,"which"contribute"to"decomposing"the"heterogeneity"in"a"number"
of"the"value"components"
5.! DISCUSSION(AND(CONCLUSION(
In"this"study,"we"examine"the"degree"to"which"managers"consider"value"creation"compared"to"
value"appropriation"in"their"selection"of"strategic"outsourcing"engagement,"and,"through"the"post=hoc"
analysis," whether" heterogeneity" exists" in" managers’" outsourcing" engagement" preference." By"
integrating" both" the" value" creation" and" the" value" appropriation" dimension" of" outsourcing" decision"
making,"our"study"sheds"light"on"the"relatively"limited"extant"studies"of"how"managers"distribute"the"
weight"among"various"value"components"in"their"outsourcing"choices."Our"experimental"and"Bayesian"
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approach,"conducted"on"the"actual"practicing"managers,"also"allows"us"to"examine"the"decision"models"
of"the"individual"managers"making"these"outsourcing"choices."
Our" major" conclusion" is" that" an" outsourcing" firm’s" value" appropriation" capability" has" a"
significant"moderating"effect"on"value"creation"components."This"effect"is"particularly"strong"when"the"
potential"for"benefits"attributed"to"resources"and"capabilities"are"shared"between"a"focal"firm"and"its"
outsourcing" provider." The" effect" is" less" significant" when" the" potential" value" is" more" certain" and"
requires" no" shared" resources" (e.g.," a" provider’s" task" specialization" and" knowledge" diversity)."
Specifically," when" the" focal" firm" expects" to" invest" in" a" relationship" involving" shared" resources" and"
capabilities"(Dyer"and"Singh,"1998),"it"has"a"stronger"incentive"to"capture"the"return"on"the"investment"
(i.e.,"value"created"in"a"relationship),"thereby"placing"a"greater"significance"on"the"value"appropriating"
mechanism" (e.g.," the" contract)." The" significant" direct" effect" of" value" appropriation" also" implies" that"
managers"do"not"simply"expect"beneficial"gains"from"an"outsourcing"engagement,"but"they"are"strongly"
cognizant"of"the"realization"of"these"potential"new"value"benefits."The"results"from"both"experiments"
are" consistent" in" showing" that" although" cost" savings" are" viewed" as" a" “have=to=have”" in" outsourcing"
choices"(e.g.,"Kremic"et"al.,"2006;"Welch"and"Nayak,"1992),"managers"do"not"overlook"the"potential"for"
value" creation" beyond" cost" savings" (also" observed" by" Mudambi" and" Venzin," 2010)." Managers" also"
expect" to" leverage" their" providers’" strong" motivations" to" innovate" and" gain" access" to" external"
capabilities" and" resources" that" are" complementary" to" their" in=house" operations" through" an"
outsourcing"relationship."This"is"reflected"in"industry"practice,"where"many"firms"attempt"to"develop"a"
long=term" partnership" with" their" outsourcing" providers," rather" than" simply" engaging" in" a" one=off"
transaction."
Our" findings" lend" broad" support" to" the" proposition" that" there" exists" heterogeneity" in" the"
preference"models"of"strategic"outsourcing"decisions,"suggesting"that"different"decision"makers"assess"
each" value" component" differently." While" almost" all" empirical" studies" in" strategy" apply" fixed" effect"
controls,"such"as"industry=level"and"firm=level"variables."Our"results"extend"this"research"by"revealing"
that" this" approach" may" not" pick" up" meaningful" heterogeneity" at" the" level" of" the" decision" maker"
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(Devinney,"2011)."As"illustrated"in"our"findings,"in"some"cases,"heterogeneity"in"the"model"of"strategic"
outsourcing"decisions"is"explained"largely"by"micro=level"factors."For"instance,"our"results"also"indicate"
that" strategic" value" components" beyond" cost" savings" (such" as" inter=firm" complementary" and" value"
appropriation)" show" a" considerable" variation" in" their" utility" value" across" decision" makers." In"
speculating" the" theoretical" explanation" for" this" finding,"we"note" that" variances" in" the"preference" for"
strategic" value" components" potentially" imply" differences" in" decision" makers’" goals" and" level" of"
sophistication" in" the" outsourcing" engagement." For" instance," higher=level" executives" with" a"
sophisticated"view"of"outsourcing"engagements"are"more"likely"to"view"outsourcing"as"part"of"strategic"
management" practice," and" hence" consider" strategic" value" components" differently" from"middle=level"
managers,"who" focus"more" on" operational" efficiency." This" further" contributes" to" extant" outsourcing"
decision=making"research:"that"the"argument"for"a"bandwagon"effect" in"outsourcing"decision"making"
might"not"be"applicable" to"more"strategic"outsourcing"choices,"which"tend"to"be" idiosyncratic"across"
decision"makers"and"organizations."
5.1.!Limitations(and(Future(Research(Directions(
We"recognize"that"there"are"limitations"in"our"study."First,"while"our"findings"tease"out"some"of"
the" factors" explaining" the" variance" in" strategic" outsourcing" choices" using" individual=" and" firm=level"
covariates," our" recruitment" of" the" sample" does" not" allow" us" to" analyze" the" firm" and" industry" fixed"
effects" in" general" as"we" did" not" sample" to" do" this." Hence," our" attempt" to" examine" heterogeneity" in"
strategic"outsourcing"choices" is"exploratory" in"nature." "While" it"hints"at"the" importance"of" individual"
level"managerial"heterogeneity,"understanding"what"may"be"driving"that"heterogeneity"would"require"
a"study"designed"specifically"to"decompose"the"heterogeneity."
Second," our" analysis" is" restricted" to" a" limited" set" of" value" creation" and" value" appropriation"
components"that"were"contained"in"the"experimental"model."This"restriction"was"necessary"in"order"to"
keep" the" size" of" experiments" manageable" for" participants." However," we" did" ensure" that" the" most"
relevant" value" creation" and" value" appropriation" components" were" included" and" did" this" based" on"
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information" from" intensive" interviews"and"prior" studies" in"outsourcing" choices."Due" to" the" complex"
nature" of" outsourcing" decision" making," many" other" alternative" factors" could" involve" and" influence"
outsourcing" choices." Being" aware" of" this" issue," we" attempted" to" control" for" these" alternative"
explanations" through" carefully" set" up" scenarios" and" the" inclusion" of" control" variables" in" the"
experimental"design."However,"the"challenge"lies"in"the"fact"that"including"additional"criteria"is"likely"
to" increase" the" amount" of" variation" found." The" amount" of" variation" within" this" small" sample"
encourages" future" research" to" overcome" this" limitation" by" improving" on," or" complementing," our"
empirical"approach."
Third,"our"attempt"to"examine"the"role"of"value"appropriation"in"outsourcing"choices"is"limited"
to"an"outsourcing"firm’s"perspective."Value"appropriation"addresses"the"question"of"how"each"party"to"
the" contract" captures" a" share" of" the" total" value" created:" an" increase" in" a" firm’s" value" appropriation"
comes"at"the"expense"of"the"provider’s"value"appropriation."Hence,"the"issue"of"value"appropriation"is"
not"entirely"determined"by"the"focal"firm"but"also"dependent"on"the"provider."While"recognizing"that"
outsourcing"providers"could"affect"the"share"of"value"appropriation,"the"DCE"only"allows"us"to"look"at"
the"effect"of"value"appropriation"from"one"side"at"a"time."Hence,"one"avenue"for"future"research"is"to"
examine" the"ex=ante" role"of" value"appropriation" in"outsourcing" choices" from"providers’"perspective."
Scholars"could"examine"this"phenomenon"by"applying"direct"economic"bargaining"experiments."
Finally," since" the" DCE" is" based" on" random" utility" theoretic" thinking," and" could" suffer" from"
biases"in"the"model"used"by"respondents,"external"validity"might"be"limited."For"instance,"if"managers"
suffer" from"overconfidence" bias" (Camerer" and"Lovallo," 1999)" or" are" using"decision"models" that" the"
experiment"was"not"designed"to"investigate,"the"findings"may"have"less"predictive"validity."In"addition,"
our"experiments"did"not"account" for"managers’" fiduciary"responsibilities."Hence," it" is"not"possible" to"
know"how"the"outsourcing"choices"made"in"the"experiments"would"translate"into"a"firm’s"final"decision"
in" reality," where" the" situations" are"more" complex" and" have" additional" factors" that" come" into" play."
Nevertheless,"the"convergence"validity"of"DCE"has"been"tested"in"several"occasions"(see,"for"example,"
Hensher" et" al.," 1999;" Louviere" and"Woodworth," 1983;" Telser" and" Zweifel," 2007)," causing" Louviere"
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(1988)" to" conclude" that" DCE" constitute" a" valid" instrument" for" explaining" and" predicting" individual"
behavior"on"actual"markets."
5.2.!Contributions(to(Theory(and(Practice(
This" research" has" direct" implications" for" managerial" practice" and" research" in" outsourcing"
decisions" and," more" broadly," strategic" decision=making" processes," especially" those" examining"
heterogeneity" and" inconsistency" in" strategic" decision" making." Our" findings" contribute" to" extant"
outsourcing" decision=making" research" in" that" they" highlight" how" managers" strategically" distribute"
value" (i.e.," utility)" among" value" creation" and" value" appropriation" components" in" their" outsourcing"
choices," which" reflects" the" real" decision=making" situation" in" which" managers" are" constrained" by"
alternatives"and"forced"to"make"trade=off"in"their"choices."The"results"further"highlight"a"significant"ex=
ante" role" of" value" appropriation" on" strategic" outsourcing" decisions." Although" most" studies" in" the"
literature"focus"on"the"ex=post"effect"of"value"appropriation"capability"and"a"contract"in"governing"and"
managing"an"outsourcing"relationship"(e.g.,"Argyres"and"Mayer,"2007;"Barthelemy"and"Quelin,"2006),"
we" show" that" the" role" of" value" appropriation" is" much" broader." In" an" environment" where" joint"
investment" is"required"(indeed" it"may"be"the"norm"when"more"“core”"resources"and"capabilities"are"
involved),"a"focal"firm’s"capability"to"ensure"efficient"value"appropriation"is"significant"in"itself"(it"has"a"
direct"effect)"and,"at"the"same"time,"manipulates"the"effects"of"potential"values"on"outsourcing"choices"
(it"has"moderating"effects)."
By" explaining" variance" in" strategic" outsourcing" choices,"we" are" among" the" early" attempts" to"
explore" the" sources" of" heterogeneity" in" the" preference"model" of" outsourcing" decisions."While" both"
research" and" popular" press" have" unraveled" the" complex" set" of" factors" underlying" outsourcing"
selection" based" on" industry" characteristics" (e.g.," outsourcing" choices" made" by" pharmaceutical" and"
biotech"companies"are"more"likely"to"be"driven"by"intangible"economic"value"components"compared"to"
those"made"by"manufacturing"companies),"our"analysis"suggests,"that"in"many"cases,"the"heterogeneity"
resides" at" the" individual=level." The" micro=foundations" approach" taken" in" this" study" enhances" our"
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theoretical" understanding" of" strategic" outsourcing" selection" by" outlining" micro=mechanisms" and"
highlighting"the"need"to"consider"the"idiosyncrasies"at"the"level"of"the"decision"maker."Consistent"with"
a" micro=foundational" logic," we" argue" that" empirical" research" is" needed" to" validate" and" extend" our"
understanding"of"factors"that"characterize"variance"in"the"preference"model"of"managers."
Another"implication"derives"from"the"use"of"DCE"methodology"in"this"research."In"response"to"
management" scholars’" call" for" a" rigorous" research" approach" for" evaluating" organizational" strategy"
(see," for" example," Bartunek" et" al.," 2006;" Vermeulen," 2005)," DCE" provide" an" efficient" and"
comprehensive" approach" for" understanding" and" examining" idiosyncratic" demand" and" complex"
decision"making" underlying" outsourcing" choices." In" addition," forced=choice" trade=offs" provide"more"
opportunities" for" creating" incentive" compatible" scale" instruments" than" Likert=based" surveys." A"
difficulty"in"studying"the"ex=ante"role"of"the"value"appropriation"capability"and"potential"value"creation"
which"may"not"naturally"appear"or"which"may"be"difficult"to"observe"in"the"real"market"is"how"to"get"
individuals"to"reveal"their"preferences"about"what"they"would"favor"in"realistic"circumstances."In"this"
case,"it"is"difficult"to"effectively"capture"innovation"benefits"and"value"appropriation"using"the"revealed"
preference" approach." Choice" experimentation" is" a" good" alternative," because" the" variables" the" study"
investigates" are" not" clearly" measured" in" the" market" and" panel" data" about" them" is" difficult" or"
impossible"to"obtain."
Insights" into" the" various"models" of" strategic" outsourcing" selection" can"be"obtained" from" the"
use"of"HB"analysis,"which"provides"an"alternative"way"to"capture"unobserved"heterogeneity"and"other"
potential" sources" of" variability" in"much" richer" detailed" than" the" results" obtained" from" the" tradition"
econometric"approaches."The"study"also"benefits"from"a"semi=parametric"specification"of"HB"approach,"
which" frees" researchers" from" possibly" strong" or" unwarranted" distribution" assumptions" about"
individual" heterogeneity." Based" on" the" empirical" evidence" here," the" HB" model" offers" an" attractive"
specification."As"such," this"work"should"be"viewed"as"an"early"attempt"of"an"exciting"methodological"
path" for" strategy" and" management" researchers" and" practitioners" (see," for" example," Hansen" et" al.,"
2004)."We"encourage"a"greater"effort"to"use"Bayesian"methods"for"a"more"sophisticated"interpretation"
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of"discrete"choice"models"and"seeking"to" further"our"understanding"of"heterogeneity" in"strategy"and"
management" research." The" potential" for" re=examining" existing" management" theories" using"
experimental" methods" and" Bayesian" approaches" should" be" recognized" as" a" means" of" improving"
theoretical"understanding"and"modern"management"practice."
In" addition," our" approach" linking" experimentation" with" HB" modeling" opens" up" a" potential"
avenue" for" a" methodology" that" can" serve" as" the" basis" of" future" work" on" the" micro=foundations" of"
management." "The"experimental" logic" allows" researchers" to" focus"on" the"decision" calculus" that" they"
are" applying," while" HB" permits" us" to" examine" individual" level" variation" in" that" calculus." Future"
research" can" takes" this" from" the" individual" level" to" the" group" level" and" there" is" nothing"
econometrically" stopping"us" from"building"multi=level"Bayesian"models" that"account" for"unobserved"
sources"of"heterogeneity"at"the"level"of"both"the"manager"and"the"firm."""
In"closing,"our"findings"yield"useful"advice"for"managers"and"firms"facing"strategic"outsourcing"
decision"making." Firms" are" increasingly" reconfiguring" their" boundaries" and" focusing" on" the" highest"
value"adding"activities"while"outsourcing"decisions"become"more"heterogeneous."Our"findings"suggest"
that"managers"should"carefully"consider"the"interdependencies"between"potential"value"creation"and"
value"appropriation"in"their"outsourcing"choices."In"particular,"managers"should"have"a"clear"vision"of"
their"outsourcing"goals"and"apply"their" judgment"policies"accordingly"(e.g.," those" looking"to" leverage"
on" value=added" rents" from" inter=firm" complementarity" might" want" to" focus" more" on" value"
appropriation" issue" in" their" outsourcing" engagement" selections)." As" such," the" explicit" study" of" how"
managers"strategically"trade"off"among"value"components"in"outsourcing"choices"could"be"a"useful"tool"
for"understanding"the"different"strategic"goals"of"outsourcing"and"predict"outsourcing"trends." In"this"
spirit," we" hope" this" study" becomes" part" of" a" growing" body" of" evidence" and" theory," with" concrete"
implications"for"practice."
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TABLE&I&
Outsourcing&Attribute&Definitions&
Decision#Attributes# Name#shown#in#DCE## Definition#provided#in#DCE#
Value&Creation:&Economic&Value!
Economic#Value#from#
Cost#Savings#
Cost#Savings# “Cost# savings”# are# how# much# your# organization# saves# by# outsourcing# an# activity# to# an# external#
operator# compared# to# the# cost# of# an# inDhouse# operation.# They# are# measured# by# the# percentage#
decrease#in#the#cost#incurred#in#performing#an#activity#after#it#has#been#outsourced.#
Value&Creation:&Strategic&Value!
Value!from!Provider’s!Resources!and!Capabilities!
###Value#from#Motivation# Commitment#to#
Innovation#
“Commitment#to#innovation”#states#how#much#your#outsourcing#provider#is#committed#to#improving#
existing#products,#services,#or#processes#or#creating#new#products,#services,#or#processes.#
####Task#Specialization# Task#Specialization# “Task# specialization”# is# the# degree# of# expertise# of# your# outsourcing# provider# in# a# particular# task.#
Think#of# it#as#the#number#of#different#business# functions#your#outsourcing#provider#provides#to#the#
marketplace.#
####Knowledge#Diversity# Industry#Specialization# “Industry#specialization”# is# the#degree#of#knowledge#diversity#your#outsourcing#provider#has#across#
industries.#Think#of#it#as#the#number#of#different#industries#your#outsourcing#provider#serves.#
Value!from!Shared!Resources!and!Capabilities!
###InterDfirm#
Complementarity#
Value#Creation# “Value#creation”#is#the#extra#value#created#from#the#combination#of#knowledge#and#capabilities#of#the#
parties#(i.e.,#your#company#and#the#outsourcing#provider)#involved#in#an#outsourcing#engagement.#
One#can#think#of#it#as#the#percentage#of#value#increase#after#an#activity#has#been#outsourced#to#an#
outsourcing#provider.#
Value&Appropriation& # #
Value#Appropriation#
Capability#
Value#Capture# “Value#capture”#is#how#efficient#your#outsourcing#contract#is#in#allowing#you#to#gain#value#created#in#
an#outsourcing#relationship.#Think#of#it#as#a#ratio#of#value#gained#to#total#value#created#from#an#
outsourcing#activity#as#a#percentage.#
Controls**!
Directionality#of#Activity# CustomerDfacing#or#
Backroom#Services#
“CustomerDfacing#or#backroom#services”#describe#whether#the#outcome#of#this#activity#has#a#direct#
exposure#to#customers.#The#operation#of#customerDfacing#services#has#a#direct#exposure#to#customers,#
while#backroom#services#involve#activities#that#provide#support#to#customerDfacing#operations#and#
hence#do#not#have#a#direct#exposure#to#customers.#
Risk# Risk# “Risk”#describes#the#extent#of#the#uncertainty#associated#with#an#outsourcing#activity#in#terms#of#cost,#
quality#and#provider#failure.#
**#Directionality#of#activity#and#risk#are#included#as#control#variables#in#the#experimental#scenarios##
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TABLE&II&
Outsourcing&Attributes&and&Levels&Used&in&the&Discrete&Choice&Experiment&
#
Attribute#
Attribute#Level#
Low$ High$
Economic#Value# Decrease#10%#or#less#
(low#cost#saving)#
Decrease#20%#or#more#
(high#cost#saving)#
Value#from#Motivation# Low#commitment#to#innovation# High#commitment#to#innovation#
Task#Specialization# Offers#a#range#of#services#
(low#task#specialization)#
Offers#one#specific#service#
(high#task#specialization)#
Knowledge#Diversity# Provides#services#across#industry#
sectors#
(low#industry#specialization)#
Provides#services#within#one#
industry#sector#
(high#industry#specialization)#
InterNfirm#
Complementarity#
0%#increase#in#value#
(no#value#creation)#
10%#increase#in#value#
(high#value#creation)#
Value#Appropriation# 25%#value#captured#
(low#value#capture)#
75%#value#capture#
(high#value#capture)#
&
TABLE&III&
Aggregate&DCM&Experiment&Results&(Multinomial&Logit)&
# Model#1# # Model#2#
Outsourcing#Attribute# coeff.# # s.e.# # coeff.# # s.e.#
Value#Appropriation# 0.314# ***# (0.02)# # 0.314# ***# (0.02)#
Cost#Savings# 0.291# ***# (0.01)# # 0.292# ***# (0.01)#
Value#from#Motivation# 0.338# ***# (0.01)# # 0.339# ***# (0.01)#
Task#Specialization# ˗0.097# ***# (0.01)# # ˗0.098# ***# (0.01)#
Knowledge#Diversity# 0.029# **# (0.01)# # 0.028# **# (0.01)#
InterNfirm#Complementarity# 0.313# ***# (0.01)# # 0.314# ***# (0.01)#
# # # # # # # #
Interactions$ # # # # # # #
Value#Appropriation#×#Value#from#Motivation# # # # # ˗0.017# # (0.01)#
Value#Appropriation#×#Task#Specialization# # # # # ˗0.033# **# (0.01)#
Value#Appropriation#×#Knowledge#Diversity# # # # # ˗0.033# **# (0.01)#
Value#Appropriation#×#InterNfirm#
Complementarity## # # # #
0.055# ***# (0.01)#
# # # # # # # #
McFadden’s$R2$ 0.221# # # # 0.224# # #
LL$ ˗7,865.68# # # # ˗7,846.11# # #
Number#of#Respondents# 72# ## ## ## ## ## ##
Number#of#Total#Choice#Tasks# 1,728# # # # # # #
* p < 0.01, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
#
#
#
#
#
38#
TABLE&IV&
Individual&Choice&Estimates&of&Strategic&Outsourcing&Decisions&(Hierarchical&Bayes)&
Attribute# Level# Base#
Mean# Heterogeneity#
coeff.# zNvalue#
#
coeff.# zNvalue#
#Value#Appropriation# 75%#value#capture# 25%#value#capture# 5.251# 2.877# **# 6.379# 1.844# *#
Cost#Savings# Decrease#20%#or#more# Decrease#10%#or#
less#
3.865# 4.603# ***# 8.243# 2.473# **#
Value#from#
Motivation#
High#commitment#to#
innovate#
Low#commitment#to#
innovate#
4.032# 6.644# ***# 6.042# 1.923# *#
Task#Specialization# Offer#one#specific#
service#
Offer#a#range#of#
services#
˗0.193# ˗0.189# # 6.941# 2.616# **#
Knowledge#
Diversity#
Provide#services#within#
one#industry#sector#
Provide#services#
across#industry#
sectors#
1.323# 1.246# # 3.954# 2.714# **#
InterNfirm#
Complementarity#
10%#increase#in#value# No#synergetic#value# 3.561# 3.552# ***# 5.280# 1.869# *#
Value#Appropriation#
×#Value#from#
Motivation#
Low#commitment#to#
innovate,#25%#value#
capture#
# ˗2.262# ˗2.456# **# 7.334# 1.929# *#
# Low#commitment#to#
innovate,#75%#value#
capture#
# 0.145# 0.177# # 5.977# 1.005# #
# High#commitment#to#
innovate,#25%#value#
capture#
# 0.873# 1.184# # 5.400# 1.088# #
## High#commitment#to#
innovate,#75%#value#
capture#
## 1.243# 0.905# ## 15.591# 2.286# *#
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
#  
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TABLE&IV&(Cont)&
Individual&Choice&Estimates&of&Strategic&Outsourcing&Decisions&(Hierarchical&Bayes)&
Attribute# Level# Base#
Mean# Heterogeneity#
coeff.# zNvalue#
#
coeff.# zNvalue#
#Value#Appropriation#
×#Task#
Specialization#
Offer#a#range#of#
services,#25%#value#
capture#
# 2.555# 1.524# # 6.607# 1.783# *#
# Offer#a#range#of#
services,#75%#value#
capture#
# ˗3.788# ˗2.153# *# 7.706# 1.646# *#
# Offer#one#specific#
service,#25%#value#
capture#
# 2.582# 1.238# # 6.930# 1.985# *#
# Offer#one#specific#
service,#75%#value#
capture#
# ˗1.349# ˗0.757# # 16.723# 1.835# *#
Value#Appropriation#
×#Knowledge#
Diversity#
Provide#services#across#
industry#sectors,#25%#
value#capture#
# ˗6.114# ˗3.890# ***# 6.250# 1.636# #
# Provide#services#across#
industry#sectors,#75%#
value#capture#
# 3.851# 2.851# **# 5.890# 1.126# #
# Provide#services#within#
one#industry#sector,#
25%#value#capture#
# ˗5.136# ˗4.521# ***# 4.222# 1.808# *#
# Provide#services#within#
one#industry#sector,#
75%#value#capture#
# 7.399# 5.063# ***# 9.587# 2.270# *#
Value#Appropriation#
×#InterNfirm#
Complementarity#
10%#increase#in#value,#
25%#value#capture#
# ˗1.518# ˗0.911# # 7.035# 1.382# #
# 10%#increase#in#value,#
75%#value#capture#
# 0.981# 1.192# # 7.511# 0.788# #
# 20%#increase#in#value,#
25%#value#capture#
# 0.489# 0.628# # 5.577# 1.721# *#
# 20%#increase#in#value,#
75%#value#capture#
# 0.049# 0.030# # 16.574# 1.488# #
# # # # # # # # #Hit$Rate$(percent$correctly$predicted)$ 0.992#
# # # # # #Log$Marginal$Density$ $$ ˗153.09# # # # # # #
*$p$<$0.1,$**$p$<$0.01,$***$p$<$0.001$
#
40#
TABLE&V&
Impact&of&IndividualH&and&FirmHlevel&Covariates&on&Heterogeneity&(WLS)&
Covariate# Value#
Appropriation#
Cost#
Savings#
Value#from#
Motivation#
Task#
Specialization#
Knowledge#
Diversity#
InterNfirm#
Complementarity#
Report&Levels&to&CEO&
0#(I#am#a#CEO)# ˗1.670***# ˗0.563# 0.664# 0.169# ˗0.013# 1.089*#
1#level# 0.876**# 0.906# 0.538# 0.114# 0.459# ˗0.144#
2#levels# 0.079# 0.560# 0.265# ˗0.236# 0.388# 1.075**#
3#levels# 0.351# 0.652# ˗0.009# ˗0.816# 0.104# 0.594#
4#levels#or#more# Reference$Level$
Industry&Experience&
1–5#years# Reference$Level$
6–10#years# ˗1.901**# ˗0.718# 0.407# ˗0.322# ˗1.053# 1.908#
11–15#years# ˗1.485*# ˗1.034# ˗0.642# ˗0.539# ˗0.895# 1.736#
16–20#years# ˗1.567*# ˗0.516# ˗0.640# 0.112# ˗0.553# 1.700#
21–25#years# ˗2.367**# ˗2.983# 0.684# 0.303# ˗0.675# 1.217#
More#than#25#years# ˗0.804# ˗0.103# ˗0.771# ˗0.417# ˗0.497# 1.226#
Outsourcing&DecisionHMaking&Experience&
0#year# Reference$Level$
1–5#years# ˗2.704***# ˗3.133# 1.608# 1.243# ˗0.072# 0.507#
6–10#years# ˗2.611***# ˗4.177*# 2.171*# 0.531# ˗0.186# 0.430#
More#than#10#years# ˗2.610***# ˗3.213# 1.268# 0.540# ˗0.411# 0.855#
Headquarter&Location&
Africa# Reference$Level$
Asia# 0.508# ˗4.028# ˗1.037# 1.877# 1.329# ˗0.152#
Australia/New#Zealand# 0.886# ˗2.778# ˗0.420# 0.000# 1.161# 0.110#
Europe# ˗0.446# ˗4.025# ˗1.058# 1.981# 1.464# 1.443#
North#America# 0.082# ˗4.277# ˗0.556# 0.503# 1.276# 0.398#
South#America# 0.737# ˗2.281# ˗2.023# 0.460# 0.553# ˗0.544#
Industry&
Others# Reference$Level$
Utilities/Construction# ˗1.406**# ˗0.894# 0.484# 0.313# 0.419# 1.515*#
Transportation# ˗2.721***# ˗0.391# ˗0.473# 2.870**# 0.652# 0.657#
Pharmaceuticals/Biotech# ˗0.479# 0.196# ˗1.560# 2.555# 3.834***# ˗1.175#
Business#Services# 0.671# 0.053# 0.160# ˗0.285# ˗0.184# ˗0.274#
Health#
Care/Education/Social#
Services#
˗0.020# 0.716# ˗1.574# 0.131# 1.502*# 1.495#
Financial#Services# ˗0.533# 0.805# ˗0.443# 2.223**# 0.985*# 1.021*#
Mining/Natural#Resource#
Extraction#
˗3.130***# ˗1.446# 0.480# 3.824*# 0.692# 3.087**#
Manufacturing# ˗0.408# 0.617# ˗1.554**# 1.943**# 0.637# 0.322#
Retail/Wholesale#Trade# ˗1.918# 2.426# 0.529# 1.933# 1.615# 1.146#
Information#Technology# ˗0.676# ˗0.072# 0.027# 1.357# 0.231# 0.510#
Government/NGO# ˗0.452# 0.394# ˗2.032# ˗0.017# 0.109# 2.683**#
Constant# ˗7.844***# ˗11.07**# ˗3.753*# 2.175# ˗0.419# ˗1.190#
# # # # # # #Observations$ 73# 73# 73# 73# 73# 73#
R$squared$ 0.594# 0.308# 0.509# 0.542# 0.395# 0.479#
Adjusted$R$squared$ 0.335# ˗0.132# 0.196# 0.251# 0.010# 0.147#
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE&VI&
Changes&in&Adjusted&R&squared*&
Outsourcing&
Attribute&
Covariates&included&
Adjusted&R&
squared&
Change&in&
Adjusted&R&
squared&
Report'
Levels'to'
CEO'
Industry'
Experience'
Outsourcing'
Decision9
Making'
Experience'
Headquarter'
Location' Industry'
Value#
Appropriation#
x# x# x# ## ## 0.056#
#x# x# x# x#
#
0.018# ˗0.038#
x# x# x# x# x# 0.335# 0.317#
Cost#Savings# x# x# x# ## ## ˗0.011#
#x# x# x# x#
#
0.023# 0.034#
x# x# x# x# x# ˗0.132# ˗0.155#
Value#From#
Motivation#
x# x# x# ## ## 0.616#
#x# x# x# x#
#
0.411# ˗0.205#
x# x# x# x# x# 0.196# ˗0.215#
Task#
Specialization#
x# x# x# ## ## ˗0.116#
#x# x# x# x#
#
0.096# 0.212#
x# x# x# x# x# 0.251# 0.155#
Knowledge#
Diversity#
x# x# x# ## ## ˗0.103#
#x# x# x# x#
#
˗0.140# ˗0.037#
x# x# x# x# x# 0.010# 0.150#
InterNfirm#
Complementarity#
x# x# x#
# #
˗0.036#
#x# x# x# x#
#
˗0.009# 0.027#
x# x# x# x# x# 0.147# 0.156#
*Coefficient#estimates#and#detailed#results#are#available#upon#request.#
